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Abstract
In 2013, the Dutch Minister of Finance nationalised
financial conglomerate SNS Reaal by expropriating all
outstanding shares in and all subordinated debt owed by
it. This article examines the ruling of the Dutch Supreme
Court of 20 March 2015 on how the compensation for
expropriated investors should be determined. It also
discusses the provisions on compensation under the
European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
Introduction
On 1 February 2013, the Dutch Minister of Finance (the
Minister) decided to expropriate all outstanding shares
in, all subordinated bonds issued by and all subordinated
loans taken up by both the Dutch holding company SNS
Reaal and by SNSBank (together: SNS).1 SNSBank was
the fourth largest bank in the Netherlands and was
considered to be a systemically important institution.
Reaal, the holding company of SNS Reaal’s insurance
arm, was the third largest insurer and fifth largest nonlife
insurer in the Netherlands.2 The nationalisation of SNS
represented the first time the expropriation tool under the
Dutch Intervention Act (Interventiewet),3 which entered
into force one year before the decision, was applied.4
Dutch Act on Financial Supervision (Wet op het financieel
toezicht, “Wft”) art.6:25 empowered the Minister to
expropriate securities issued by or assets and/or liabilities
of a credit institution or insurance company if the situation
of the relevant institution was posing a serious and
immediate threat to the stability of the financial system.6
Shortly after the nationalisation hundreds of interested
parties lodged an appeal against the expropriation decree
with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the
Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de
Raad van State), the highest Dutch administrative law
court in the Netherlands. They argued that the
expropriation violated civil rights, that the expropriation
of subordinated debt was unnecessary and that the
position of SNS did not pose an immediate threat to the
financial stability. The highest Dutch administrative court,
however, upheld themajor part of the decision.7 Following
this administrative decision another crucial issue arose:
how to compensate the expropriated investors? In a
separate court proceeding on the damages to be paid as
compensation to the expropriated investors, the Enterprise
Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal
(Ondernemingskamer) held in its interim ruling on 11
July 2013, that the Minister had failed to convincingly
justify his position that the compensation offer of EUR
0 represented full compensation, as required by law.
Experts were appointed to advise on the proper value of
the expropriated securities at the moment immediately
prior to the nationalisation.8 The Minister subsequently
lodged an interim appeal with the Dutch Supreme Court
(Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) against this interim
judgement of the Enterprise Chamber. On 20March 2015,
the Supreme Court issued its ruling and clarified the
manner in which compensation for expropriation should
be determined pursuant to the Intervention Act.9 This
article aims to provide an overview of the considerations
of the Supreme Court as regards the determination of the
compensation. Secondly, it discusses the provisions on
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1 See Decree by the Minister of Finance of 1 February 2013 regarding the expropriation of securities and assets of SNS REAAL NV and SNS Bank NV in connection with
the stability of the financial system, and to take immediate measures with regard to SNS REAAL NV. Available at: https://www.government.nl/documents/decrees/2013/02
/01/decree-by-the-minister-of-finance-regarding-the-expropriation-of-securities-and-capital-components-of-sns-reaal-nv-and-sns-bank [Accessed 2 February 2016]. See
for an English overview of the developments in the run-up to the nationalisation, the nationalisation decision itself and an evaluation of the nationalisation, Financial Stability
Board, Peer Review of the Netherlands: Review Report, 11 November 2014. Available at: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Netherlands-peer-review-report.pdf
[Accessed 2 February 2016].
2Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, para.2.13; Financial Stability Board, Peer Review of the Netherlands: Review Report 11
November 2014, p.46.
3An unofficial translation of the Intervention Act is available at: www.dnb.nl [Accessed 9 December 2015].
4Wet van 24 mei 2012 tot wijziging van deWet op het financieel toezicht en de Faillissementswet, alsmede enige andere wetten in verband met de introductie van aanvullende
bevoegdheden tot interventie bij financiële ondernemingen in problemen (Wet bijzondere maatregelen financiële ondernemingen), Stb. 2012, 241. The Act came into force
with retroactive effect from 20 January 2012.
5As implemented by the Intervention Act.
6Wft art.6:2.
7Administrative Law Section of the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) 25 February 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:BZ2265. The English version of this judgment is
available at: www.raadvanstate.nl [Accessed 9 December 2015]. See B. Bierens, “Over het besluit tot nationalisatie van SNS Reaal en de rechterlijke toetsing daarvan:
terugkijken en vooruitblikken” [2013] Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht 109–117. In subsequent cases concerning the expropriation before the European Court of Human
Rights, the Court rejected several complaints in a partial decision on 14 January 2014 (see Adorisio v The Netherlands (47315/13) (2015) 61 E.H.R.R. SE1) and held other
applications inadmissible (see ECHR 11 February 2014, VEB NCVB v The Netherlands (50494/13)) and ECHR 17 March 2015 (Adorisio v The Netherlands (47315/13,
48490/13 and 49016/13)). On 26 March 2014, the Court of Justice of the EU (T-321/13) ruled the challenge to the European Commission’s decision C1053 (22 February
2013), which determined that the State aid provided by the Dutch Government to SNS was compatible with the internal market, inadmissible.
8Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966.
9Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661.
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compensation under the European Bank Recovery and
ResolutionDirective (BRRD), which had to be transposed
into the national laws of all European Member States by
1 January 2015.10 The BRRD aims to provide national
authorities in the EU with a harmonised and expanded
set of tools and powers to intervene in a failing credit
institution or investment firm and contains rules on the
compensation of involved parties.
Compensation under the Dutch
Intervention Act
TheDutch Constitution states that expropriationmay only
take place in the public interest and with compensation
assured in advance, in accordance with rules set by or
pursuant to the law.11 The Dutch State shall grant
compensation to a title holder as regards an asset or
security that is expropriated under Wft art.6:2 or a right
to securities to be newly issued that is lost under
application of Wft art.6:2. The compensation must
represent a full reimbursement of the damage the
expropriated party directly and necessarily suffered as a
result of losing his asset, security or right and must
amount to the “actual value” of the expropriated asset,
security or right at the time of expropriation.12 Pursuant
to Wft art.6:9(1), two aspects have to be taken into
account for the determination of the mentioned actual
value. First, the future prospects of the financial institution
concerned in case no expropriation would have taken
place. Secondly, the price that, given the prospects, would
have been concluded at the time of the expropriation in
a hypothetical sale in the open market between the
expropriated party as a reasonable seller and the
expropriating party as a reasonable buyer.13 When an
expropriation decision has been taken, the Minister must
make an offer of compensation to the expropriated parties.
Subsequently, the Enterprise Chamber has to confirm this
offer or determine a higher amount of compensation if
the offer is deemed insufficient.14
Offer of the Minister
On 4 March 2013, the Minister announced his offer for
compensation. In his opinion, “… without the
expropriation SNS REAAL and SNS Bank would have
gone bankrupt or have gone into liquidation …” and in
that scenario, following the ranking of the creditors’
claims, “… the proceeds of the winding-up would be
insufficient to pay all ordinary creditors, and nothing
would remain to the subordinated creditors, let alone the
shareholders”. Given these prospects, his offer for
compensation to the expropriated securities and assets
amounted to EUR 0 per financial instrument.15 In the
interim ruling on 11 July 2013, the Enterprise Chamber
ruled that theMinister’s justification underlying the offer
was unconvincing and that it was likely that the offer did
not constitute full compensation for the damage suffered.16
The Enterprise Chamber therefore considered that it now
had to determine an amount of compensation exceeding
the Minister’s offer and it appointed experts to advise on
the valuation.17 The Dutch Supreme Court, however,
struck down this decision. It held that the Enterprise
Chamber must determine the level of compensation
independently.18 This means that the Enterprise Chamber
is not bound to the offer of the Minister, although the
offer may serve as a basis. It may declare a higher amount
of compensation if it considers that the offer does not
constitute a full reimbursement for the damage suffered
through the expropriation.19Thus, the Enterprise Chamber
could not decide that a higher amount of compensation
than EUR 0 had to be paid, solely because of an
insufficient reasoning by the Minister.20
Reasonable seller and buyer
Dutch law requires full compensation by the State, which
must be calculated by reference to the “actual value” of
the expropriated assets at the moment of expropriation.21
Asmentioned above, to determine the actual value several
assumptions must be met. These include the price that,
given the prospects of SNS, would have been concluded
at the time of the expropriation in a hypothetical sale in
the open market between the expropriated party as a
reasonable seller and the expropriating party as a
10Directive 2014/59 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891, and
Directives 2001/24, 2002/47, 2004/25, 2005/56, 2007/36, 2011/35, 2012/30 and 2013/36, and Regulations 1093/2010 and 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the
Council [2014] OJ L173/190.
11Dutch Constitution art.14.
12Wft arts 6:8–6:13 provide for the procedure how the compensation should be determined.
13Wft arts 6:8 and 6:9.
14Wft arts 6:10 and 6:11.
15 For the official letter and a translation of the letter of the Dutch Minister of Finance regarding the offer for compensation with respect to the expropriation of securities
and assets of SNS REAAL and SNS Bank of 4 March 2013. Available at: https://www.government.nl/documents/letters/2013/03/04/letter-and-unofficial-translation-of-the
-letter-with-offer-for-compensation-sns-reaal [Accessed 2 February 2016]. The principle that in determining the compensation for the expropriated parties it should be
assessed what the parties would have received in a liquidation scenario, can also be found in the BRRD, see BRRD Recital 50: “Affected shareholders and creditors should
not incur greater losses than those which they would have incurred if the institution had been wound up at the time that the resolution decision is taken”, and see BRRD
Recital 51: “If it is determined that shareholders and creditors have received, in payment of, or compensation for, their claims, the equivalent of less than the amount that
they would have received under normal insolvency proceedings, they should be entitled to the payment of the difference where required under this Directive”.
16Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, para.6.25.
17 In accordance with Wft art.6:11(3). Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, para.6.26.
18 In accordance with Wft arts 6:10 and 6:11.
19 In accordance with Wft arts 6:8 and 6:9. Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 059, nr.3 (Explanatory Memorandum Intervention Act), p.68; Dutch Supreme Court 20 March
2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, paras 4.8.2–4.8.3; Opinion Advocate General Timmerman 10 October 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:1825, para.7.4.
20Dutch Supreme Court 20March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.8.3; Opinion Advocate General Timmerman 10 October 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:1825, para.7.4.
21Wft art.6:8.
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reasonable buyer.22 The Enterprise Chamber interpreted
this as follows: The actual value is deemed to be the price
that would be paid by the highest bidder in case of a sale
of the expropriated assets and securities in the most
appropriate manner and after the best preparation.
Moreover, the valuation should be based on individual
hypothetical transactions and not, at least not necessarily,
on a sale of all the expropriated assets and securities at
once.23 In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that this
interpretation is not in line with the text of the
Intervention Act nor with the parliamentary history.
According to the Supreme Court, the actual value should
be assumed to be the result of only one hypothetical sale
in the open market, which will not necessarily give rise
to the best possible price.24
Listed price of the securities
The Dutch legislator debated whether or not to primarily
base the compensation for expropriated listed securities
on the listed price prior to nationalisation, being the most
recent listed price or the weighted average listed price
over a specific period.25 He decided against doing so
although he considered that it is obvious to base the
valuation of securities partly on the listed price.
Consequently, the Enterprise Chamber saw no reason
why—for the determination of the actual value of the
securities, besides other factors—the appointed experts
should not particularly take into account the listed price
at or immediately prior to the expropriation.26 The
Supreme Court, however, did not agree with this analysis.
It held that in determining the actual value of the
securities one should attempt to approach the real
financial position of the institution, taking into account
all relevant facts and circumstances, including those not
yet known by the investors.27 For this reason, the method
of valuation should not heavily depend on the listed price,
which might not necessarily be an adequate reflection of
the price that a reasonable buyer would be willing to pay.28
Supervisory actions Dutch Central Bank
Following SNS Bank’s poor financial position, the Dutch
prudential supervisory authority, the Dutch Central Bank
(De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB), intensified its
supervision of SNS Bank from 2008 onwards. At the end
of 2011, DNB concluded that SNSReaal was not capable
of resolving its financial position through private means.29
DNB and the Ministry of Finance established a project
group to analyse potential scenarios for SNS Reaal. One
year later, DNB determined that SNS Bank suffered a
large capital deficit. Following the periodic evaluation of
the capitalisation of SNSBank (known as the Supervisory
Review and Evaluation Process, or SREP) and after
notifying the Ministry of Finance, DNB sent a letter to
SNS Bank on 27 January 2013 (a so-called SREP
decision), imposing a deadline of 31 January 2013 to
present a final solution how the capital shortage could be
covered on a short term. Since neither a solution nor a
possible alternative was found, DNB advised theMinister
to exercise his powers under the Intervention Act.30 In its
interim ruling, the Enterprise Chamber emphasised the
interconnectedness of the preparations for the
expropriation on the one hand and the possible initiating
of an insolvency proceeding or revocation of SNS Bank’s
banking licence by DNB on the other. The Enterprise
Chamber held that it was likely that DNB, assuming that
no expropriation would take place and being aware of all
the relevant facts and circumstances, would have taken
the SREP decision not at all or not in the same form.
Consequently, the valuation to be made by the Enterprise
Chamber should possibly take into account other possible
actions of DNB than actually occurred in the period prior
to the expropriation.31 Yet, in the Supreme Court’s view,
DNB holds an independent position with its own
supervisory powers in relation to the Dutch State.
Therefore, in contrast to the decision of the Enterprise
Chamber, the Supreme Court held that the action of DNB
that actually took place at the moment immediately prior
to the expropriation has to be taken into account in
determining the compensation.32 In other words: in
determining the actual value of the expropriated asset,
the fiction that the SREP decision could have been taken
in another form or not at all should not be taken into
account.
Discounting State aid
In 2008, the DutchGovernment strengthened SNSReaal’s
capital position by buying Core Tier 1 capital securities
of SNS Reaal.33 The Enterprise Chamber as well as the
Supreme Court considers this transaction to be qualified
22Wft art.6:9(1).
23Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, paras 6.8, 6.9 and 6.75.
24Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.15.3; Opinion Advocate General Timmerman 10 October 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:1825,
para.7.23.
25Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 059, nr.3 (Explanatory Memorandum Intervention Act), p.74.
26Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, paras 6.15 and 6.75.
27Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.19.2.
28As acknowledged by the Dutch legislator, a compensation which is primarily based on the listed price, could lead to the situation where investors would speculate on the
possible expropriation of a failing institution, knowing that a higher listed price would lead automatically to a higher compensation. Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 059, nr.3
(Explanatory Memorandum Intervention Act), p.74; Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.19.2.
29 Financial Stability Board, “Peer Review of the Netherlands: Review Report” 11 November 2014, p.47.
30 Financial Stability Board, “Peer Review of the Netherlands: Review Report” 11 November 2014, pp.47–49; Letter of the Dutch Minister of Finance to the Parliament of
1 February 2013 concerning the nationalisation of SNS Reaal. Available at: https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2013/02/01/nationalisation
-of-sns-reaal [Accessed 2 February 2016].
31Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, paras 6.11 and 6.19.
32Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.16.
33Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, para.2.9.
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as State aid.34 The State aid that the institution already
received has to be taken into account in determining the
actual value of the expropriated asset.35 The Enterprise
Chamber as well as the Supreme Court found that the
State aid has to be taken into account to prevent
expropriated parties from receiving a higher amount of
compensation than would be justified in view of the actual
damage suffered.36 The Enterprise Chamber decided that
the appointed experts must assess the actual financial
benefit the expropriated parties received from the State
aid.37Moreover, in contrast to the opinion of theMinister,
the Supreme Court held that discounting State aid does
not mean that every euro SNS Reaal increased in value
after the recapitalisation of 2008 has to be deducted in
determining the actual value of the expropriated asset,
but merely the amount of State aid in the strict sense.38
The value of an institution may increase as a result of
State aid, eventually even exceeding the amount of the
initial State aid. In his opinion of 10 October 2014, the
Advocate General at the Dutch Supreme Court clarified
this with an example. A bank is granted State aid to avert
insolvency and subsequently issues new bonds, but
nevertheless ends up in a financially critical situation.
The Minister expropriates the bonds. In calculating the
damage suffered by the “new” bondholders, the value of
the institution immediately prior to the expropriation is
of importance. The value of the institution in the
hypothetical case it was not granted State aid and the
institution had entered into an insolvency proceeding
instead, does not give any indication of the damage the
new bondholders suffered. Hence, an increase in value
of the institution exceeding the amount of State aid should
be regarded as (part of) the new bondholders’ damage.
Moreover, deducting every euro the institution has
increased in value after the State aid was provided can
discourage investors to invest in recapitalised
institutions.39
BankRecovery andResolution Directive
The BRRD aims to provide national authorities in the EU
with a harmonised and expanded set of tools and powers
to intervene in a failing credit institution or investment
firm. The new rules enable a so-called resolution
authority, which in the Netherlands is DNB, inter alia, to
transfer (part of) a failing bank or investment firm to a
private sector purchaser or a publicly owned bridge
institution, to transfer the institution’s “bad” assets to an
asset management vehicle and to exercise a bail-in, i.e.
the cancellation or dilution of shares and a write-down
or conversion into equity of liabilities.40 The Dutch
legislator has not yet implemented the rules of the BRRD,
although a recently published legislative proposal has
been brought before the Dutch Parliament. The
Explanatory Memorandum to the legislative proposal
briefly examines the relationship between the new tools
and powers of DNB under the BRRD and the
expropriation power of the Minister under the Dutch
Intervention Act.41 The expropriation power of the
Minister will continue to exist alongside the powers of
DNB under the BRRD, also with regard to credit
institutions. Nevertheless, the Dutch legislator considers
the expropriation power to be in the nature of emergency
powers legislation (staatsnoodrecht), applicable in case
the BRRD and the Single ResolutionMechanism (SRM)42
do not provide for suitable solutions or in case all options
under the BRRD and the SRM have been exhausted.43
Following the exercise of the resolution tools and powers
under the BRRD, the entitlement to compensation of the
involved shareholders and creditors can be based on two
grounds. First, pursuant to art.1 First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights interferences
with property rights may not be disproportionate andmay
require compensation to the amount which is in
reasonable proportion to the value of the property.
Secondly, the BRRD requires that in the application of
the resolution powers and tools no creditor shall incur
greater losses than it would have incurred if the institution
had been wound up under a normal national insolvency
proceeding: the “no creditor worse off” principle. If the
involved creditors and shareholders are worse off, they
must be compensated by the difference between the
amount they have actually received and the (larger)
amount they would have received, in case the financial
institution would have entered into a normal insolvency
proceeding immediately before the resolution measure.44
Thus the compensation arrangement under the BRRD
focuses on the gone-concern scenario of the institution,
whereas the Intervention Act takes into account a broader
set of assumptions, including the future prospects of the
34Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, para.6.28; Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.22.1.
35Wft art.6:9(2).
36Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 059, nr.3 (Explanatory Memorandum Intervention Act), p.74; Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966,
para.6.28; Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.22.1.
37Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, para.6.32.
38Amsterdam Court of Appeal 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:1966, para.6.29; Dutch Supreme Court 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.22.3.
39Opinion Advocate General Timmerman 10October 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:1825, para.7.39; Dutch Supreme Court 20March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661, para.4.22.3.
40BRRD Ch.IV.
41Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 34 208, nr.3 (Explanatory Memorandum to the Implementation Act for the European Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms), pp.50–51. The initial consultation proposal did not consider the relationship between the expropriation power of the Minister under the
Intervention Act and the powers of DNB under the BRRD, as observed in the reaction to this consultation proposal by the Hazelhoff Centre for Financial Law, see Hazelhoff
Centre for Financial Law, Reactie inzake het consultatievoorstel Implementatiewet Europees kader voor herstel en afwikkeling banken en beleggingsondernemingen van
21 november 2014 (Reaction on the consultation proposal for the Implementation Act for the European Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions
and Investment Firms of November 21, 2014), 19 December 2014. Available at: www.internetconsultatie.nl [Accessed 9 December 2015], p.6.
42Regulation 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L225/1.
43The SRM, the second pillar of the European Banking Union, establishes a European resolution board, i.e. the Single Resolution Board, which will apply the rules of the
BRRD and will adopt decisions regarding the resolution of significant credit institutions in the euro area as of 1 January 2016.
44BRRD Recitals 50–51; BRRD arts 34(1)(g) and 74–75.
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institution. Nevertheless, in case of an insolvency scenario
the compensation arrangements may lead to the same
results.
Conclusion
The Dutch Supreme Court referred the case back to the
Dutch Enterprise Chamber, which now has to come to a
new decision as regards the amount of compensation the
expropriated SNS investors should receive for their
expropriated shares and bonds, based on the advice of
appointed experts and on the guiding principles provided
by the Supreme Court. One of these principles requires
the Enterprise Chamber to determine the level of
compensation independently if it deems the Minister’s
compensation offer insufficient. However, the Enterprise
Chamber can also confirm the Minister’s offer for
compensation, which was in this case EUR 0 per financial
instrument. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the
loss of the expropriated investors has to be compensated
at the actual value the assets and the securities represented
at the time of expropriation. In determining the actual
value of the expropriated securities, the listed price of the
expropriated securities prior to the expropriation may not
particularly be taken into account. The powers and tools
under the Dutch Intervention Act are broadly comparable
with the powers and tools national resolution authorities
have under the BRRD, although the provisions on the
compensation for the involved parties use different
principles and criteria. Notwithstanding these different
approaches to calculating compensation, both paths could
lead to the same result if the Dutch Enterprise Chamber
concludes that, without the expropriation, SNS would
have gone into insolvency proceedings. In that case the
expropriated investors will be entitled to a compensation
of EUR 0 per financial instrument. Hence, the “no creditor
worse off” principle seems bad news for investors.
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